China-Arab States Cooperation Forum: An Overview
The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF)’s 10th ministerial meeting is being held in Beijing on May 30. It’s also the 20th anniversary of the CASCF, and every government loves round-number anniversaries, so there will likely be lots of tributes to the institution.
As folks are getting ready to track all of the action coming up over the next week, it’s a good time for a brief overview of what the CASCF is and what it does. If you’re looking for a deeper dive, Dawn Murphy joined me on the China-MENA podcast in May 2022 to talk about it in the context of the PRC’s multilateral engagement in MENA, and she also wrote a great chapter in my Routledge Handbook on China-Middle East Relations, published in 2022. (I know the book is overpriced - typical academic book problem - but pro tip: you can usually find PDFs of academics’ writings on ResearchGate, Google Scholar, or Academia. If you look there and still can’t find what you’re looking for, try writing the prof an email asking for the PDF. We’re usually overjoyed when someone actually wants to read our work.)
So, the CASCF is a multilateral organization including China and all of the Arab League member countries. It was formed in 2004 during a state visit to Egypt from President Hu Jintao. CASCF followed the model set by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was established in 2000. Nine countries - Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia - have membership in both organizations.
CASCF was created with the goal of coordinating policy between China and the twenty-two Arab League member states. It has held foreign ministers’ meetings every other year since 2004, during which the foreign ministers of each country attend and map out the policy priorities for the following two years, alternating between an Arab and a Chinese city (usually Beijing). China has a permanent representative to CASCF, an appointment that is given to an ambassador with significant experience in the Arab world. The current ambassador to CASCF is Li Chen; he was previously ambassador to Bahrain and Qatar. There are ten issue-specific subcommittees that meet regularly. So all in all, its become pretty institutionalized and is a useful mechanism for shaping relations between China and Arab countries.
In 2021 Chinese FM Wang Yi met with the Arab League during a visit to Egypt and buried beneath statements on COVID, counter-terrorism, and Israel-Palestine was the announcement that the CASCF had been elevated to include summits. This explains why the 2022 meeting was held during Xi’s state visit to Riyadh, including several heads of state rather than only foreign ministers, and also explains the presence of heads of state in Beijing for the meeting this week.
Typically this forum is used to make signficant announcements. During the opening speech for the 2014 CASCF ministers’ meeting, President Xi rolled out the 1+2+3 cooperation framework. Few were paying attention, but it formalized China’s approach to building relations with Arab countries, focusing on 1) hydrocarbons, 2) trade & investment and infrastructure construction, and 3) nuclear energy, renewables, and space satellite. When great levels of Chinese contracting and tech expansion in the Middle East became apparent a few years later it seemed to catch a lot of folks off guard, but again, it was right there in the 2014 speech.*
Another example: at the 2018 CASCF ministers’ meeting in Beijing, China pledged $23 billion in loans, aid and investment. At the time there were a lot of puzzled headlines - it seemed to come out of the blue - but that was largely because the forum rarely gets much notice in Western media and it seemed odd to see such a big commitment from China to Arab countries; it was only 6 years ago but for most people China was still flying under the radar in the Middle East. For the record, the $23 billion broke down as $20 billion in loans for states with reconstruction needs, $3 billion in special loans for the region’s financial sector, nearly $150 million to support social stability, and $90 million in humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. So mostly loans, which was lost in much of the reporting at the time.
So, expect headlines about China-Arab cooperation in the coming days, and know that this week they’re being driven by the CASCF. Gaza is going to be high on the agenda. I’m not sure what the other key items will be. If you’ve been reading this newsletter you’ll have noticed a few stories about investment forums and financial coordination; there could be some announcements in those sectors. Watch this space.
*I’m in the process of wrapping up a book on the 1+2+3 cooperation framework and hope to have it submitted to the publisher this summer. The framework itself seems to have been sidelined - I had coffee recently with a young Chinese diplomat and he had never heard of it - but it was front and center in the 2016 Arab Policy Paper, and it has really shaped a lot of how China has developed relations with several countries in the Arab world over the past decade.