India in the Middle East
As I mentioned, India’s Observer Research Foundation was the co-host of last week’s Yerevan Dialogue, and there was a lot of discussion of India’s growing engagement in countries and regions where we don’t typically think of it as a consequential foreign policy actor. It just so happened that around the same time India’s Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was in in Riyadh for an India-GCC strategic dialogue ministers’ meeting. And Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed Al Nahyan was in India for an official visit. Which all makes this a good opportunity to shift the focus away from China for a day and look more about what India’s doing in the Middle East.
Most of the action is in the Gulf, of course, where there is an enormous expat Indian population and long and deep historical ties. India is a massive energy importer from the Gulf and two-way investment is significant. Security and strategic relations are on the rise as well. It’s under most people’s radar, but you should absolutely be thinking of India as a major regional actor. With recent multilateral initiatives like I2U2 (if that’s still a thing) and IMEC (which is), the reach expands to the East Med as well.
With that in mind, a few relevant stories and reports:
UAE-India ties are growing stronger in more than one key area - The National. An op-ed by Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, who is the president of the Emirates Policy Center, the Emirati think tank I referenced yesterday. This piece gives a good overview of the bilateral.
Sheikh Khaled's visit to India aimed to explore opportunities to elevate the UAE and India's strategic partnership to new heights, under the framework of their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which came into force in May 2022. Both countries have signed agreements for the long-term export of liquefied natural gas, as well as co-operation in civil nuclear energy, green hydrogen and the application of the state-of-the-art innovative technologies in the food industry.
The UAE is trying to further strengthen co-operation with India across several areas of mutual interest, with a focus on digital health care, pharmaceutical research, biotechnology, genome medicine, renewable energy, sustainability, AI, logistics, supply chains, agricultural technology, strategic minerals and more.
It is clear that the two countries are committed to preparing for the future and actively contributing to shaping its contours.
India shines as an energy opportunity for Gulf amid China slowdown - The National. From Robin Mills, an energy analyst in Dubai looking at the potential for deeper energy cooperation between India and the GCC.
For the GCC and neighbours, India offers robust and continuing oil demand growth, while China’s prospects have dimmed because of its economic slowdown and the growing use of electric vehicles.
BP forecasts India’s oil use growing by 1 million barrels per day to 2030 and rising all the way to 2045, while China’s declines after 2030. It envisages India’s gas demand growing 4.3 per cent annually up to mid-century, with China a much slower 1.1 per cent. By then, India’s gas use would be as large as that of the EU, and its import needs would be almost two-thirds of China’s.
At mid-century, BP thinks that India’s final energy consumption would be almost as large as that of the US, and India and China would be virtually the only two remaining large coal users. That represents a huge opportunity to replace with gas and renewable power.
التنافس الصيني-الهندي على قيادة الجنوب العالمي: التداعيات على دول الخليج (Sino-Indian competition for leadership of the Global South: Implications for the Gulf states) - Emirates Policy Center. This is an Arabic-language report published in January 2024 looking at China-India competition, a topic I haven’t seen discussed very much in the Gulf and one that I talk about frequently here. Given the depth of Gulf-Asia ties, the possibility of Asian geopolitics playing out here is not as far-fetched as one would think. This report is worth a read. The key points, translated:
In recent years, the Chinese-Indian competition for leadership of the Global South has increased, especially in light of the different approaches of each of them towards this South. It is likely that this competition will escalate further in the coming years, and will result in important multi-dimensional repercussions, including the areas of financing, economic support, infrastructure projects, reform of multilateral institutions, and great power competition between Beijing and Washington.
While China wants to implicitly share the world with Washington as the leader of the Global South, India is vocal about its desire to create a bridge between North and South. This is done, according to India's vision, by reforming the global system, but in a way that does not lead to changing the status quo or ending or undermining American leadership, but rather includes giving India a central role in the reform process.
The competition between China and India has repercussions on the positioning and interests of the Gulf states, the most important of which is that the military competition between the two powers in the Indian Ocean will have direct repercussions on the security of the Gulf region, and will be reflected in infrastructure projects, and the intensification of the competition between them threatens to reduce the effectiveness of institutions representing the South, such as BRICS, which the Gulf countries are looking to benefit from.
Sheikh Khaled's official visit to India ends as economic partnerships are signed - The National. A brief overview of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’s official visit to India.
Indian Foreign Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Passing Through a Difficult Phase with China - Asharq Al-Awsat. The headline is misleading; this is a rather broad interview with FM Jaishankar on India’s presence in the Middle East, covering energy, trade, the Red Sea, Gaza, IMEC, and tech. On the India-GCC front:
On India’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Jaishankar stressed that ties between the two sides is deeply rooted in a rich tapestry of history, culture, and shared values.
He continued that in recent years, this relationship has evolved into a modern partnership across a wide range of sectors, including the economy, energy, defense, technology, education, and people-to-people connections, among others.
“This partnership is based on trust, mutual respect, and a shared vision for the future,” he said.
The foreign minister noted that about 9 million Indian nationals live and work in the Gulf countries, forming a living bridge between the two sides.
From India’s perspective, the Gulf region is seen as the country’s “extended neighborhood,” geographically close, culturally similar, and economically integrated, he remarked, adding: “Together, they form a dynamic and significant force.”
According to Jaishankar, India’s vast and growing market offers enormous investment opportunities, while the Gulf region is a hub for energy resources, global trade, and a bridge to many avenues of cooperation.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Among the new areas of collaboration, the digital revolution offers unprecedented opportunities for cooperation in the field of technology. Education and skill development are also essential components of our partnership. People-to-people and logistical connections represent another important area of cooperation, bringing strategic, economic, and social benefits to our countries.”
However, the geopolitics came into the discussion, inspiring the headline:
Commenting on India’s foreign relations, in particular with China, the United States and Russia, the minister said that his country pursues a multifaceted foreign policy, engaging with all major powers.
He explained: “The quality of relationships will naturally depend on how aligned our interests are. Specifically, we are going through a challenging phase in our relations with China due to the border situation. Russia is a long-standing partner, and our economic cooperation with them continues to grow steadily. With the United States, we have moved beyond the historical hesitations and built a strong strategic partnership.”
This is relatively mild, compared with the headline. However, at the end of August his take on India-China was more pointed. From The Hindu:
Mr. Jaishankar said that if people are complaining of trade deficit with China and "we are too", it is because decades ago, "we consciously overlooked the nature of Chinese production and the advantages which they enjoyed in a system where they got a level playing field with all the advantages they brought to bed".
"China in many ways is a unique problem because it is a unique polity, it is a unique economy. Unless one tries to grasp that uniqueness and understand it, the judgements, the conclusions and the policy prescriptions flowing out of it can be problematic," he said at the ET World Leaders Forum here during a session titled 'New India's Risks, Reforms and Responsibilities'.
"There is a general China problem. We are not the only country in the world which is having a debate about China. Go to Europe, and ask them what is among their major economic or national security debates today. It is about China. Look at the United States [of America]. It is obsessed with China, and rightly so in many ways," Jaishankar said.
So, the fact is that it is not only India which has a China problem, he said.
"India has a China problem... a special China problem that is over and above the world's general China problem," Mr. Jaishankar said.
India’s diplomacy has a ‘S. Jaishankar problem’ - Global Times. The Minister’s comments inspired an impassioned response, which has since been scrubbed from the Global Times’ site. A sample:
In India, there are many "China experts," like Jaishankar, who are considered authoritative on issues related to China in India simply because their past work involved some connection to China or East Asia. In reality, they often lack a true understanding of China and may not even grasp India's fundamental national conditions and interests. For instance, Jaishankar claims there is a "China problem" and that China works in a very different way. In fact, many countries believe that the "India problem" is the real problem, with India being the one that operates in a very different way, making it difficult to deal with. Jaishankar argues that banning Chinese telecom technology is necessary for security reasons, but is American technology truly secure? So far, we haven't heard of any "Huawei scandal," but we are all aware of the PRISM scandal revealed by Edward Snowden.
It is always difficult to prove the authenticity or falsification of the high-profile statements made by Jaishankar on China. They are quite deceptive in the field of international public opinion. For example, he said the Global South countries placed their trust in India and China skipped two meetings convened by India last year to listen to their concerns. Then, on another occasion, he admitted that China was not among the invitees of such summits. If China was not invited to the Global South conference hosted by India, and then India accused China of not participating in it, how did India come to the conclusion that China does not pay attention to the countries of the Global South? The logic behind this is probably something only Jaishankar can understand.
Jaishankar's diplomatic wrangling has won him some "fans." However, the diplomatic strategies and tactics he led were full of tricks - they had neither the moral sense of Jawaharlal Nehru's diplomacy nor the ethic sense of Indira Gandhi's diplomacy. India's diplomacy under the guidance of Jaishankar has set tricks on all countries, and what it has ultimately gained is other countries' tricks on India.
As minister of external affairs, Jaishankar's priority seems not to be national interests. Although he now seems to be very active in "decoupling" with the Chinese economy and not willing to see the strengthening of China-India economic cooperation, he would change his position if necessary. When he retired and got an appointment in the Tata Group, because Tata needed to develop business with China, he worked hard to promote cooperation between Tata and China. Many politicians in India just use the country as a tool for personal gain. They do not take the long-term interests of the country seriously. In fact, this is the "real problem" of India's diplomacy now, and it can be called the "S. Jaishankar problem."
Finally, on my China-MENA Podcast I’ve had some relevant episodes:
In February 2023, I spoke with C. Raja Mohan about The Middle East in the US-India-China Strategic Triangle.
This April Jean-Loup Samaan joined me to talk about minilateralism in MENA, with a focus on IMEC.
In May Ambassador Navdeep Suri and Kabir Taneja came on the show to discuss their report for ORF on IMEC and how India is looking at the Middle East.
In June Hasan Alhasan, an India-Gulf expert from Bahrain, talked with me about Gulf-Asia relations, with lots of great insights about India’s role in the region.
There’s lots more to consider here, but really, the point is that the binary of US-China competition does a bad job of explaining the complexity of geopolitics in the Gulf, and anyone who isn’t bringing India (among others) into the analysis is missing an important set of variables.