BYD expands in Saudi Arabia, Ministerial delegation from UAE visit China, Israeli analysis on China & Israel-Iran war, Academic article on China-Palestine trade
China’s BYD plans Saudi expansion in EV race - AGBI. More BYD in the Kingdom. 10 showrooms by the end of 2026, up from 0 at the start of 2024.
The company plans to add another seven locations by the second half of 2026, Bloomberg reported, quoting Jerome Saigot, managing director for Saudi Arabia.
BYD is the largest seller of EVs globally. It opened its first Saudi store in May last year and operates three showrooms. A Dubai showroom followed in September.
The company expects to sell more than 5,000 vehicles this year in Saudi Arabia, the report said.
HE Amna Al Dahak hails UAE-China ties as unique model of successful cooperation in various sectors - Zawya. The UAE’s Minister for Climate Change and Environment was in China last week.
HE Amna Al Dahak Hails UAE-China Ties as Unique Model of Successful Cooperation in Various Sectors Including Agriculture, Food Security and Climate
The visit underscores the UAE and China's commitment to a comprehensive strategic partnership, moving beyond traditional ties to address global challenges collaboratively.
Her Excellency toured the UAE-China Friendship Forest of Date Palm, a landmark initiative symbolizing enduring bilateral ties and agricultural cooperation.
The diverse UAE delegation engaged with leading Chinese institutions in climate action, sustainable agriculture, and food security, fostering knowledge exchange and identifying joint initiatives.
Committed to Itself: China and the Israel-Iran War - IISS. A good piece from Galia Lavy and Ori Sela at INSS. This excerpt is part of a longer section subtitled “China’s Balance Sheet at the end of the War”, analyzing the impact of the Israel-Iran war on China’s regional interests. It’s worth reading the whole article.
At first glance, in the context of global geopolitics, the inter-power struggle, and the fact that the United States positioned itself as directly involved in the campaign against Iran—both militarily (the attack on nuclear sites) and politically (bringing the war to an end, at least for now)—it appears that China suffered a loss. China did not stand decisively and visibly alongside Iran, its supposed strong ally and partner in the “axis,” through concrete, assertive actions—apart from rhetorical support. President Xi’s “Four-Point Plan” did not even serve as a basis for discussion, and attempts to promote resolutions regarding the war in the UN Security Council also failed. Even if China acted behind the scenes to prevent Iran from blocking the Strait of Hormuz, its role in this regard remains obscure. Therefore, it can be argued that China lost points—primarily political ones—in the Middle East.
That said, one must ask: Did China have much to lose in the eyes of the Middle Eastern states to begin with? Especially since March 2023, when the Iran–Saudi Arabia reconciliation agreement was signed, China has repeatedly tried to bolster its status as a mediator and a significant geopolitical player in the region. During the Swords of Iron war in July 2024, China convened the Palestinian factions in Beijing for a reconciliation summit, where the Beijing Declaration was signed, calling for the formation of a Palestinian government including all factions. China claimed this as further proof of its regional importance. However, China preferred not to address critical questions—such as its actual role in the Iran–Saudi reconciliation or whether the Beijing Declaration had any real significance. Image-building took precedence. Likewise, regarding the Houthi issue, China preferred to keep a safe distance, primarily seeking to protect its military and civilian vessels. In other words, for the region’s countries, even taking into account the Middle Eastern positioning China has crafted in recent years, it became clear since October 7, 2023, that China is not a central player in the core issues of the region.
Indeed, regional states distinguish between China’s genuine importance in economic and infrastructure matters and political-military issues, in which they clearly rely on the United States. Therefore, one could argue that the region’s countries never expected more than rhetoric from China in the first place—and so, China did not lose points but rather reinforced existing perceptions about its role.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on July 16, 2025 - PRC MoFA. There were two MENA-relevant questions in today’s MoFA press conference, one on SCO and another on China’s potential role in MENA security. Given Xi Jinping’s address at the SCO meeting it’s not surprising that this question was given the deeper answer, including Wang Yi’s 5-point proposal (surprise!) for the future development of the SCO. As for China helping stabilize the region? “The situation in the Middle East is still complex and sensitive.”
China News Service: The Meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States was held in Tianjin yesterday. Could you share more information on that?
Lin Jian: On July 15, the Meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States was successfully held in Tianjin. Before the meeting, President Xi Jinping had a group meeting with foreign ministers and heads of permanent bodies of the SCO in Beijing. He stressed that in the face of a turbulent and changing international landscape, the SCO must stay focused, remain confident, act efficiently and play a more proactive role. It needs to remain true to its founding mission, respond to the people’s expectations and shoulder its mission of the times. It should also serve as the torchbearer of the Shanghai Spirit, be a doer in deepening cooperation and a steadfast contributor to building a community with a shared future for mankind, and inject greater stability and positive energy into the world.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired the meeting and made a five-point proposal for the future development of the SCO: first, staying true to SCO’s founding mission and carrying forward the “Shanghai Spirit”; second, sharing responsibility and laying a solid foundation for security; third, seeking mutual benefit and win-win results and creating engines for development; fourth, upholding amity and good neighborliness and building a beautiful homeland; fifth, staying the course and defending fairness and justice. When jointly meeting the press with SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev after the meeting, Foreign Minister Wang announced that the SCO summit will be held in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1. Participants spoke highly of China’s work as the rotating chair of the SCO, commended the important role of the SCO and expressed their readiness to cooperate and coordinate with China to make the SCO Tianjin summit a full success.
In-depth discussions at this meeting made full political preparations for the upcoming Tianjin summit. We believe that with the concerted effort of all parties, the Tianjin summit will be a gathering of solidarity, friendship and fruitful results, and the SCO will enter a new stage of high-quality development featuring greater solidarity, coordination, dynamism and productiveness.
Asharq News: The Middle East is facing uncertainty regarding to the ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Is China considering playing any role to deescalate tensions or prevent the return to war, especially given that negotiations are yet to be resumed?
Lin Jian: You mentioned the situation in the Middle East. This was discussed at the Meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States. The situation in the Middle East is still complex and sensitive. China stands ready to work with the rest of the international community to advocate peace, advance a political settlement, and restore peace and stability in the Middle East as soon as possible. This is in the common interest of countries in the region and the international community.
From Yiwu to Hebron: China and the changing dynamics of Palestinian trade in the West Bank - Mediterranean Politics, by Oliver Hayakawa. I haven’t had a chance to read this article yet but I’ve heard Oliver present research on Chinese trade in Palestine at two different conferences over the years, the first being in 2016, and he’s been thinking about this issue longer than most. Mediterranean Politics is a really good journal, not easy to publish in, so this is most likely a very good article.
ABSTRACT
This article explores the dynamics of trade between Palestine and China, emphasizing the role of Palestinian traders in navigating global markets amid the constraints of Israeli occupation. Drawing on a decade of ethnographic fieldwork, the study focuses on the roles of Yiwu, China, and Hebron, Palestine, as important nodes in shaping these connections. These trade networks highlight the emergence of a diverse group of economic actors in Palestine–both small and large-scale traders–who engage in global commerce to maintain their livelihoods. These actors, despite operating under severe economic and political pressures, utilize international trade not only as a means of survival but as an instrument of economic resistance, underscoring their agency within the challenging realities of daily life under occupation. By situating the Palestinian political economy within a broader global context, this article moves beyond the typical local-centric analyses of the Israel-Palestine conflict, offering a unique contribution of how global linkages influence local economic landscapes. The study thereby expands our analysis of the Palestinian political economy by looking beyond the ‘crony capitalists’ and Palestinian Authority linked elites that dominate much research, while reshaping our understanding of the economic dimensions of the Israel-Palestine conflict and its intersections with global commerce.