China-Egypt, Iran-Russia, the IRGC in Iranian politics, a contract for Saudi solar plant, finance MoUs with Dubai, Chinese language in Omani schools
Egypt and China: A partnership for the future - Al-Ahram (Egypt). An interesting short column describing features of the Sino-Egyptian bilateral.
On the economic lever, China has participated in many major projects, especially in infrastructure, transportation, and railway sectors.
For example, it participated in the construction of the business district in Egypt's New Administrative Capital, the launch of the electric train in the Tenth of Ramadan area, Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, and the launch of Egyptian satellite EgyptSat-2.
In addition, it participated in strengthening financial cooperation and extending the local currency swap agreement as well as Egypt's success in issuing "Panda" bonds in China and joining the BRICS group.
These successes would not have been achieved without the political will of both countries' leaders to strengthen this partnership and build on it by signing the executive programme for the comprehensive strategic partnership for the next five years (2024-2028).
This programme represents a roadmap for developing bilateral relations and joint efforts to localize industries and transfer technologies as a priority for Egyptian-Chinese cooperation in the future.
Nothing really new here if you’ve been following China-Egypt. I wrote a bit about this during the CASCF when President Al Sisi was in Beijing, and since have recommended articles by John Calabrese at the Middle East Institute that provide a deep dive into the bilateral. Essentially, I think the moribund Egyptian economy drives a lot of this cooperation. A couple of years ago I was in a track 2 in Cairo and a local economist was lamenting the fact that foreign private sector investment had no interest in a corrupt market. This made for a much easier playing field for Chinese SOEs, and Egyptian officials, with few options, came to see China as a lifeline. This quote from an Egyptian official in 2018 still resonates, I think: “There are economic powers who have the ability to help us but not the desire, and others who have the desire but not the ability. China tops the list of those who have both the ability and the desire.”
Russian-Iranian military cooperation: How much can they depend on each other? - Atlantic Council. China-MENA adjacent, but highly relevant. By Mark Katz, who has been tracking Russia-Iran for decades. From this, I see a bit of the same dynamic I wrote about yesterday regarding the difficulties inherent in the China-Iran relationship - Mark writes, “An agreement on a new twenty-year Russian-Iranian cooperation agreement has yet to be finalized—with Russian sources pointing to Tehran as the reason.” The internal political dynamics in Iran - see the next article - make for a challenging partner. Mark’s conclusion:
Despite their differences, Russian-Iranian military cooperation will likely continue—and increase. But with both now on the back foot, the question is just how useful their cooperation is. Moscow is urging Iranian restraint in responding to Israel over the death of Haniyeh in Tehran not because of any inherent peace-loving nature, but because the Kremlin understands that, with its forces tied down in Ukraine, it is not in a position to do much to protect Iran in a wider conflict with Israel—especially if the Jewish state receives US military support. And it might have occurred to the Islamic Republic’s leaders that Iranian drones and ballistic missiles sent to Russia are no longer available for use against Israel or US forces in the Middle East.
However, while military assistance that Moscow and Tehran receive from one another has not allowed either Russia to prevail against Ukraine or Iran to prevail against Israel and the United States in the Middle East, it allows each to continue prosecuting these conflicts—something which leaders in Russia and Iran are clearly determined to do. Absent being able to somehow bring about an end to either conflict, the United States and its partners in Europe and the Middle East do not appear to have a viable means of forcing or persuading either Moscow or Tehran to reduce their military cooperation.
For more on the China-Russia-MENA triangle, I recommend this episode of my podcast with Mark and Li-Chen Sim, recorded in December 2023.
The Indomitable IRGC: How the Revolutionary Guards Prevent Iran’s President From Charting a New Course -Foreign Affairs. By Jon Alterman and Sanam Vakil. Also not specific to China-MENA, but reinforces the point I made in yesterday’s post and above: Iran is a hard partner to work with because of domestic factors that are working on different levels. Jon and Sanam are among the sharpest observers of Middle East politics I know; I spoke with Jon for this post on the Palestinian unity agreement, and Sanam has also been on my podcast to talk about Chinese mediation in the Saudi-Iran rapprochement. In this article they explain why the orientation of Iran’s president (reformist or hardliner) matters less than many assume, because the IRGC wields tremendous power and influence:
More than any other faction in Iran, the IRGC profits from isolation. The heavily sanctioned Iranian economy spins off billions of dollars in smuggling revenues that the group dominates. That money, in turn, supports conservative patronage networks and funds the Iranian proxies across the Middle East that form the so-called axis of resistance. In effect, the IRGC runs a complex Ponzi scheme that perpetuates the authority and influence of a select few at the expense of ordinary Iranians. That fact, more than any resistance the clerical elite put up to Pezeshkian, will pose the most significant obstacle to any effort he makes toward reform and moderation.
CEEC signs a $976 million contract to build a 2 GW photovoltaic plant in Saudi Arabia - REVE.
CEEC (China Energy Engineering Corporation) recently announced that it has signed an EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contract valued at $976 million to build a photovoltaic power plant in Saudi Arabia.
The contract involves the construction of the 2,000 megawatt (MW) Haden solar PV IPP (Independent Power Plant) project in Saudi Arabia, and construction of the project is expected to last 31 months.
Shenzhen, Dubai enhance financial cooperation - China Daily.
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Dubai Financial Market (DFM) have signed a memorandum of understanding outlining plans to explore closer cooperation in indexes, exchange traded funds, and fixed-income products, and the feasibility of new mechanisms and channels for cross-market financing.
China to support investors and enhance bilateral trade - Gvt of Dubai Media Office.
The MoU was signed by H.E. Mohammad Ali Rashed Lootah, President and CEO of Dubai Chambers, and XinYuan Pan, General Manager of Bank of China – Dubai Branch, at Dubai Chambers’ headquarters. The agreement outlines a framework for enhanced cooperation between the two parties and is aimed at contributing to achieving their shared goals through the exchange of knowledge and services, as well as enhancing mutual support for investors, entrepreneurs, and businesses in Dubai and China to boost the growth of bilateral trade and investments and strengthen economic relations.
MoE to introduce Chinese in Omani schools - Muscat Daily.
Laying the groundwork for this, H E Dr Madiha bint Ahmed al Shaibaniya, Minister of Education, issued Ministerial Decision No 192/2024 which cancels two earlier decisions (No 389/2011 and No 129/2022) concerning a special committee responsible for the trial teaching of French and German languages.
The new decision aligns with MoE’s broader strategy to expand the teaching of multiple foreign languages in the coming years. ‘Introduction of Chinese is part of this strategy and reflects the ministry’s commitment to enhancing language education in Omani schools.’
How China thrives in a world of turmoil - The Economist.
Zhou Bo, a retired PLA senior colonel, chides Western governments for arguing that, as the largest trading power on Earth, China should be willing to strike Houthi targets or apply pressure to Iran, in the name of upholding freedom of navigation on the high seas. The root cause of the crisis is “because Israelis are bombing and killing in Gaza”, he says. The Houthis have said that Chinese-flagged ships are not their target, he adds, and most Chinese cargoes are already sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. Mr Zhou, now at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, cautions that frigates and destroyers—the warships that the PLA would send—have limited air defences. What, he asks, would be the purpose of such ships entering the Red Sea and firing on the Houthis? As for China applying pressure on Iran: “The point is at what cost would you make use of your influence?”