China-Iran, Does China prefer Harris or Trump?
China and Iran Are Establishing the Second Silk Road in a Region on the Brink of All-out War - Haartz. As always, sharp analysis from Alon Pinkas - his column at Haartz is a always must-read for me. He starts with a point that seems counter-intuitive for a lot of people watching regional events over the past couple of years:
Ironically, Iran and the Iranian-Israeli crisis have became an area where the United States and China may want and need to cooperate. Each has a vested interest in preventing escalation and while the Americans are more involved, it is not inconceivable that China is playing a role in mitigating risks and restraining Iran.
I actually made a similar argument in this 2019 report for the Atlantic Council, where I argued that the Middle East was one of the few regions in the world where US and Chinese interests converged more often than not. I think the space available for the two to coordinate has clearly gotten smaller since then, but Iran is an issue where there has been some evidence of Beijing and DC reaching out to each other. Immediately before the January 2021 Alaska meeting between the US and China, for example, Vice-Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu publicly warned that “there are some new changes in the current Iranian nuclear situation. All parties should increase their sense of urgency.”
I spent about three hours talking with a Chinese Iran specialist yesterday, and the main takeaway was that Iran is an incredibly difficult partner for Beijing, one that undermines many of China’s regional interests. This is something I’ve heard time and again while talking with Chinese Middle East specialists. Iran is an important partner on paper, but in reality it does little to advance Chinese interests. Pinkas addresses this here in a way that I think is useful to consider:
The current conventional wisdom that defines China and Russia as core supporting pillars of the "axis of chaos," centered around Iran and extending to its regional proxies, may be true. But the broader picture is much more nuanced.
First, unlike Russia, China is not interested in chaos, anarchy and unpredictability. This is not about geopolitics but business, commerce and outreach, as well as its self-image of being reserved and risk-averse where Chinese interests are not directly involved.
I’ve argued countless times that China’s interests in the region are primarily economic and that means stability is the prize. Iran does nothing to add to that, so it often seems that China’s main objective is giving Tehran enough to moderate its aggression. This is something I hear pretty regularly when talking with Arab analysts - that China’s relationship with Iran is seen as useful since an isolated Iran is more dangerous.
Read the column, follow Alon on Twitter if you’re still there - I finally pulled the plug on my account the other night.
China ready to cooperate with new Iranian govt: Chinese envoy - Tehran Times. This is a short interview with Cong Peiwu, China’s ambassador to Iran. Lots of platitudes, not much depth. He does talk about the utility of Iranian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
Iran's joining the SCO has injected new vitality into it, which is in line with the expectations of the international community and the common interests of emerging market countries and developing countries.
Strange. No mention of Iran launching missiles into SCO partner Pakistan earlier this year, which didn’t bode well for the organization’s ability to address security concerns among members.
Does China Prefer Harris or Trump? - Foreign Affairs. Useful piece in that the lead author, Wang Jisi, is China’s more prominent international relations scholar and his work is quite reliable.
Given the broad similarities of both the Trump and the Biden administrations’ approach to China, Beijing is preparing itself for the outcome of the U.S. elections with great caution and limited hope. In April, Xi restated to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken that “China welcomes a confident, open, prosperous, and thriving United States and hopes the United States will also look at China’s development in a positive light.” Unfortunately, the likelihood that the next U.S. administration will view China’s development positively is low. As China continues to prioritize domestic development and security, it will likely strive to defend its economic and governance models while preserving space for global trade and investment. For a long time to come, U.S.-Chinese relations seem unlikely to return to the deep exchanges and cooperation that occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Yet if a rapprochement is out of the question, China and the United States can still maintain stability and avoid catastrophe, whoever is in the Oval Office.