Hormuz as Precedent
Getting Beijing to Yes on Bahrain's UN Resolution
The United Nations Security Council is expected to vote tomorrow on Bahrain’s proposal to re-open the Strait of Hormuz, which tells us they’ve gotten around the objections of China, France and Russia to the earlier draft of the resolution. For a good recap, check out this piece from Reuters. The sticking point, apparently, was language on the use of force to open the Strait. From the Washington Post:
Bahrain’s initial draft would have allowed countries “to use all necessary means” — U.N. language that would include possible military action — “in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman” to secure passage and deter attempts to interfere with navigation…
China’s U.N. Ambassador Fu Cong opposed the original draft’s authorization for the use of force, calling it “unlawful and indiscriminate.” Speaking to the council earlier Thursday, he warned that it “would inevitably lead to further escalation of the situation and lead to serious consequences.” He urged the council “to proceed with caution” and actively work for de-escalation and dialogue.
Yesterday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Bahraini counterpart Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani where he “made clear China's principled stance of opposing aggression and advocating for peace.” So it seems that there was some behind the scenes diplomacy to get China to a yes vote, or at least not a veto.
The WaPo refers to the new proposed resolution as “significantly watered-down” with a focus on a defensive rather than offensive approach:
The proposal now authorizes countries “to use all defensive means necessary and commensurate with the circumstances in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters” to secure passage and deter attempts to interfere with international navigation “for a period of at least six months.”
Why China’s objections? It’s probably a combination of several factors. First, we keep hearing from Trump that the US is having talks with Iran, so the use of force during negotiations would be counterproductive. Although totally on brand.
There’s also a level of consistency in Chinese messaging, that diplomatic solutions are preferable to military solutions. If the goal is stable, predictable passage through the Strait, military action will undermine that. The risk would be retaliation from Iran, escalation, and long-term disruption to energy supply. I’m skeptical that a diplomatic solution will avert those outcomes any time soon, but I assume that Beijing’s logic is that a military response means we would have to accept that as a near/mid-term fact and diplomatic solutions would be off the table.
And of course, there is the deep-rooted suspicion of US intentions. I’m sharing a People’s Daily op-ed below, but the general theme is that this war is a reckless extension of US hegemony:
Yet the history of the Middle East over the past decades is rich in examples where the more the United States resorts to unilateral use of pure force, the more it exposes the limits of its power.
And along with that paradox, America’s myth of morality has gone bankrupt. Remember? There was a time when Washington still tried to cover its hegemonic undertakings with the narrative of delivering so-called freedom and democracy. Today, it is only interested in flexing muscles.
While the world community is getting increasingly fed up with Washington’s reckless addiction to global domination, America’s policy-makers are still being trapped inside a fantasy they have created for themselves. It seems that they have lost the ability to do serious reflection, not to mention coming to terms with the fact that the era of unipolarity has long gone.
Accepting a military response to the Straits closure would legitimize use of force, preemptive strikes, and unilateral security enforcement, at least from Beijing’s perspective. China doesn’t have the hard power to prevent this outcome, but it does have a veto on the UNSC and there’s no way it’s going to dilute the value of that power. If the US is going to resort to force outside of the UN, then you can be damn sure Beijing is going to use that as exhibits A through Z when it’s promoting its Global Initiatives, or recruiting for BRICS or SCO membership: “We’ve been warning you all along about American hegemony - now look at what they did in the Gulf.” And really, there is so much openness to that kind of messaging around the world right now.
What will the US do next in its war on Iran? Chinese pundits point to a likely path - South China Morning Post. This piece has some commentary from Chinese Middle East experts. Zhang Chuchu, whose great work I flagged again earlier this week, is one of the sharpest thinkers on MENA I know in China; some of her thoughts:
Washington would likely carry out “limited ground operations” over the next few weeks.
“If [the US ground forces] do nothing after being deployed, Trump has no ‘win’ to point to. He needs substantive military achievements – a tangible result he can use as leverage to declare victory,” Zhang said, adding that Trump had not reached that point of claiming victory yet.
Trump’s core objective remained reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Zhang added.
“To get there, I expect him to further target Iran’s key nuclear facilities … Actions such as seizing islands or securing enriched uranium are also possibilities we should continue to monitor.”
On Trump’s messaging:
“What the US is pursuing is the intermittent release of ‘good news’ regarding negotiations. By doing so, Trump aims to soothe market sentiment and offset high oil prices,” she said.
“This is Trump’s current objective: he is seeking a short-term or temporary de-escalation of the conflict, rather than a permanent, total ceasefire.”
And her post-war outlook:
“Looking at precedents like the wars in Iraq and Libya, it’s very likely that Iran will face a period where the central government is extremely frail,” she said.
“This erosion of central authority could create a political vacuum, which might then deepen regional instabilities.”
Washington’s Sisyphean Trap in the Middle East - People’s Daily. The tone of this op-ed is consistent with the pieces I shared earlier this week.
Clearly, the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war on Iran is falling far short of Washington’s initial expectations -- a swift operation with limited use of military power to topple the current Iranian government, and in turn, tighten its grip on one of the world’s richest oil reserves. Perhaps, Washington’s January campaign against Venezuela had misguidedly emboldened the decision-makers in the White House.
The Trump administration is clearly caught in a dilemma: pulling back now would amount to an unmistakable failure, while leaving itself grappling with the shock of soaring oil prices triggered by an impasse in the Strait of Hormuz; yet pressing ahead with a ground offensive risks dragging the United States back into another Middle Eastern quagmire. With the mid-term elections just months away, the administration wants neither of the two scenarios.
And this is more than a policy failure; it is a symptom of a deeper identity crisis involving America’s global hegemonic ambition. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington seems to have arrogated a mandate to rule the world as it wishes, as well as a powerful force that can match its global domination.
China and Iran: I Will Believe It When I See It - Andrea Ghiselli’s Thoughts on China. A good piece from Andrea that he put together after the 5-point plan was announced earlier this week. Of course, subscribe to his Substack immediately, and then go to the ChinaMed Project Substack and subcribe to that too.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on April 2, 2026 - PRC MoFA. Finally, there was a lot of Middle East War focus in yesterday’s MoFA press briefing.
AFP: Donald Trump has said the U.S. would continue extremely hard strikes against Iran for two to three weeks and once again threatened to hit energy infrastructure if Iran does not reach a negotiated settlement with him. Can China comment on Trump’s timeline of continued strikes as well as his targeting or vows to target energy plants?
Mao Ning: Military means do not address the fundamental issue. To escalate the conflict does not serve any party’s interest. Once again we urge parties to the conflict to immediately stop military operations and start peace talks as soon as possible to resolve issues through dialogue and negotiation and prevent more serious blows to the world economy and global energy security.
Anadolu Agency: U.S. President Donald Trump in his address to the nation about the war in Iran suggested, “Countries who receive oil through Hormuz Strait should just go to the Strait and take it. Iran is essentially decimated, so use it for yourselves.” What’s China’s comment?
Mao Ning: The root cause of the disruption at the Strait of Hormuz is the U.S.-Israel illegal military operations against Iran. Only by ending the military actions and restoring peace and stability in the Gulf can the international shipping lane be open and safe. The international community needs to work together for deescalation to prevent regional turmoil from further hitting the global economy and energy security.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: According to a report by Iran’s Ministry of Science, since the start of the U.S. and Israeli aggression, 20 universities and student dormitories have been attacked, and some professors at Iranian universities have also been targeted for assassination. In this context, Iran’s University of Science and Technology, Isfahan University of Technology, and Imam Hossein University have all been directly targeted. My question is, what is your view about this matter?
Mao Ning: China opposes attacks on civilians and civilian facilities. Attacks on schools in particular are an egregious violation of international humanitarian law. Once again we call for an immediate end to military operations and return to dialogue and negotiation as soon as possible to prevent even worse humanitarian disasters.
AFP: Just a follow up on your earlier response to the question about the Strait of Hormuz and Trump’s comments on it. This week, Great Britain is set to host talks with dozens of countries on this issue. I wonder if you can share any details about how China plans to be part of the parties that suggest to cooperate on the transit through the Strait?
Mao Ning: An early ceasefire and restoration of peace and stability in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters is what the international community hopes to see, and all parties should work for this end. China is ready to continue to play a constructive role.
Bloomberg: About the Pakistan-China five-point peace formula, has that been shared with the Iranian side?
Mao Ning: The Five-Point Initiative is issued to the public and is an open initiative. I think parties have taken note of the initiative.
PTI: To follow up on the Iran-U.S. conflict. Regarding the talks that were held between China and Pakistan the other day, there were reports that Iran has sent a message to China seeking security guarantees, if they can be provided for them to agree a ceasefire. Can you confirm any such thing because certain think tanks have already reacted to that. Has any such a request been made by Iran to China to provide security guarantees?
Mao Ning: The readout on the meeting between the Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers has been released, which you may refer to. Since the ongoing conflict in Iran broke out, China has been actively working for peace. China supports all efforts for peace. We stand ready to enhance communication and coordination with all sides and work for restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.
Bloomberg: One more on the Iran situation and global energy supplies. Is China considering or would China consider any international cooperation efforts to secure the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz? And would Beijing be willing to act as an interlocutor on behalf of any of its Asian neighbors?
Mao Ning: The Strait of Hormuz and its adjacent waters form an important international trade route for goods and energy. All eyes are on whether stability can return to the Strait and whether traffic will resume soon. The key lies in the stop of military actions.


I wonder if Beijing’s stance against UN endorsement of military force to open the Straits of Hormuz might also be related to its interest in precluding UN military involvement in any possible future Taiwan Strait conflict? Setting a marker now rather than waiting until it’s blatantly self-serving?