Is China Really Helping Rebuild Iran’s Missile Arsenal?

Also: analysis on China's MENA policy from Israel, Kuwait reviews progress on 22 Chinese projects, where are the Chinese EVs in Turkey?

Iran looks to China to rebuild its missile capabilities, Israelis concerned - YNet News. A lot of people sent me this Tweet late last week:

The ‘may’ in the first sentence of the Tweet is being asked to do a lot, since the column is also based on speculation. Is China sending missile tech to Iran? I have no idea. On the one hand, it would seem to be irrational; that tech could be used to undermine stability in a region where China gets between 40-50% of its crude oil, where it does hundreds of billions of trade every year, and where its SOEs have made fortunes in contracting. From a rational perspective, PRC leaders would look at the economic realities of its presence in the Middle East and continue to do what they’ve mostly done - avoid the geopolitics and continue making money.

But rational analysis gets us into trouble sometimes. I think the PRC has been remarkably consistent in the Middle East, but I also think the Middle East is pretty low on Beijing’s hierarchy of foreign policy interests. The biggest issue is always - ALWAYS - how issues at the international level affect the Party’s hold on power. How does that make Iran important?

China gets oil from Iran, but it can get oil from lots of countries. Iran’s discounted crude is a nice bit of bargain hunting, but so is Russia’s, and there have been points in the recent past when the threat of secondary sanctions from the US made Iranian oil unappealing, and the Saudis increased their exports to China to make up for it. The energy angle doesn’t explain Iran’s utility.

Iran offers connectivity to the Gulf via overland transportation lines, which create alternatives to chokepoints that are patrolled primarily by the US navy, which is not ideal for Beijing. But maritime shipping is a far more efficient way to get your stuff to and from markets. Compare the maritime ports between China’s east coast and the Gulf against the urban centers between China’s western provinces and Iran’s west coast. I’ve always thought the ‘Iran as a hub in the BRI’ argument is weak, not just for economic reasons but also for logistical reasons. Moving stuff by road or rail across Central Asia, through not very populated countries, to get to Iran’s not very efficient ports, is far less appealing than moving stuff by ship to the many ports managed by Chinese companies. The geographic angle doesn’t offer a satisfying explanation of Iran’s utility either.

I’ve written so much about the economic angle that I don’t want to rehash it, other than to say that yes, Iran is a country with a big population of educated and entrepreneurial people. But it’s also a country with a corrupt government that is far more interested in keeping itself in power than in improving its economy. Chinese companies could make a lot of money there, someday, inshallah, but they’re already making lots of money in the UAE and Saudi. Mature, established economic partnerships are worth more than potential hypothetical ones.

So really, Iran’s importance is that it too has a deeply unpopular government that is under-performing economically, alienating neighbours, and locked into a grievance-based narrative of how its been disrespected and marginalized by the West. That made it useful when Iran was seen as a Middle East superpower. Now that its military weakness has been exposed and regime stability looks tenuous, Chinese leaders are probably concerned about how regime collapse in Iran could have blowback in other authoritarian countries. They’re probably concerned that it could have blowback at home too.

This is highly speculative, but so is the column I’m responding to, so I get to go down the rabbit hole too. Why would China provide that tech to Iran? I imagine because it would be seen as a way to prop up a shaky regime, or at least signal to Israel and the US that it’s willing to do so. No doubt we’ll hear more about this soon, and I’ll be interested to hear from anyone who has insights into the issue.

Therefore, the Iranians understand that they must maintain a significant missile force as a strategic threat against Israel. Unlike the development of nuclear weapons, Iran is not bound by international treaties preventing it from building an arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Western intelligence agencies, mostly those in Europe, have observed Iranian and Chinese cooperation in that regard. China supplied Iran with some equipment after the October 2024 altercation with Israel, but is now actually rebuilding the Iranian capabilities.

Senior Israeli officials said the Chinese intentions are not entirely clear and that Israel relayed messages to Beijing. They said China did not confirm that it would replenish Iran's missile stores, but the matter was of great concern and could have significant strategic implications.

Biased Neutrality: China’s Rhetoric Amid Escalating Tensions in the Middle East - INSS. Roy Ben Tzur at INSS’s Glazer Israel-China Policy Center published this piece, looking at China’s economic and diplomatic relations with Israel while positioning itself as a supporter of Palestine. It’s a topic that’s received a lot of coverage over the past two years and I’m not sure there’s much left to be said about it at this point.

Here’s the conclusion:

China’s stance during the Swords of Iron war demonstrates the challenge in interpreting the foreign policy of a global power operating in multiple arenas with diverse tools of expression. On the multilateral and official level, China claims neutrality, but in practice, maintains a consistently pro-Palestinian stance, refrains from condemning Israel’s adversaries, and portrays Israel as the almost exclusive aggressor in regional conflicts. This has been evident in assertive statements and initiatives at the UN Security Council, with sharp, one-sided condemnations of Israeli actions in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Yemen, and repeated references to “the just struggle of the Palestinian people.” At the same time, on the bilateral level, some economic ties between the countries have been maintained and even expanded, alongside the current ambassador’s intensive public activity, characterized by friendly diplomacy and promoting cooperation. In the direct channel with Israel, this functional split in China’s policy does not indicate a strategic shift but rather a pragmatic approach, signaling a willingness to return relations to their pre-war state, when economic ties flourished despite China’s positions on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The distinction between China’s official discourse in the international arena and its local approach in Israel raises questions for Israel’s policy toward China. Thus far, Israel’s response has been characterized by restraint, with few comments on Chinese statements remaining mostly at the diplomatic level. However, given China’s firm alignment in the diplomatic and strategic spheres with Israel’s adversaries, it is worth considering actions that reflect Israel’s value-based, political, and security sensitivities. Given China’s prominent role in global affairs, it is essential to formulate a measured and clear diplomatic message. If it chooses to balance its positions and recognize the complexity of the threats facing Israel, China could play a meaningful role in advancing solutions to conflicts in the Middle East. In this context, Israel can also signal the limits of its patience, emphasizing that a stable partnership also requires mutual responsibility in both discourse and action.

Kuwait, China review progress on 22 joint development projects - Zawya.

Minister of Public Works Dr. Noura Mohammad Al-Mashaan chaired a meeting on Thursday of the Ministerial Committee for Following Up on the Executive Status of Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed between Kuwait and China.

The meeting reviewed the latest progress on 22 development projects outlined in the MoUs between Kuwait and China, with particular focus on strategic areas such as the Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port project, electric power and renewable energy development, low-carbon waste recycling systems, housing projects, wastewater treatment infrastructure, and the development of free and economic zones.

The chair of the ministerial committee conveyed the leadership's strong interest and directives to closely monitor major development projects, stay updated on their progress, and accelerate implementation in coordination with Chinese government entities.

Assistant Foreign Minister for Asian Affairs and member and rapporteur of the ministerial committee, Ambassador Sameeh Johar Hayat, indicated that meeting was part of regular follow-up on the executive status of the agreements and MoUs signed between the governments of Kuwait and China.

He affirmed the continued commitment to taking all necessary measures and steps that would contribute to accelerating the implementation of major development projects in the country.

The meeting was attended by Minister of State for Municipal Affairs and Minister of State for Housing Affairs Abdulatif Hamed Al-Mashari, Minister of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy and Acting Minister of Finance and Minister of State for Economic Affairs and Investment Dr. Subaih Abdulaziz Al-Mukhaizim, Director General of the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority Sheikh Dr. Meshaal Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Head of the Fatwa and Legislation Department Counselor Salah Ateeq Al-Majed, and Assistant Foreign Minister for Asian Affairs and member and rapporteur of the ministerial committee, Ambassador Sameeh Johar Hayat.

China’s planned Turkish EV factories have yet to power up - The Economist.

WHEN BYD, China’s biggest electric carmaker, offered a $1bn investment in the summer of 2024, Turkey rolled out the red carpet. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s president, attended the signing ceremony. Officials in Manisa, where the company plans to open a new factory, mused about a future “Chinatown” to house BYD workers. Yet a year down the line, despite reports the company would accelerate work on the plant at the expense of one in Hungary, things have not progressed much. The factory is supposed to open next year, but there are no signs of construction save for a few containers and the occasional dump truck.