After the dust had settled from the China Arab States Cooperation Forum I reached out to several friends and colleagues around the Middle East to gauge their reactions to it. Their responses are by no means representative; everyone I spoke with is either an academic, policy analyst, or think tanker and all have done advanced work on China-Middle East relations. The point of the conversations wasn’t to elicit critical views of any one country - China, Israel, the US, whatever - but rather to get a sense of how serious and thoughtful people from the region responded to the CASCF, and how effective they thought China’s efforts to position itself as a partner to the Arab world, especially on the issue of the Gaza crisis.
I asked everyone a variation of the same four questions:
Were many people in (Israel/Arab World) following the China Arab States Cooperation forum closely? Is it seen as important?
Did the joint statement on Palestine surprise you? (You can find a translation here)
Is China seen as an important actor in the Israel-Palestine dispute?
After the joint declaration, do you think the Israeli government would be willing to work with China on anything beyond trade or non-critical contracting? Or has China's response to October 7th done irreparable harm to the relationship? / After this forum, do you think Arab publics and governments see China as an important partner in addressing regional problems?
The answers that follow are lightly edited for clarity and anonymized, although I think it’s clear if the speaker is Arab or Israeli.
Were people in (Israel/Arab World) following the China Arab States Cooperation forum closely? Is it seen as important?
I don't think people are taking it that seriously. The forum itself, it is more about the dynamic in the region. You know, is China succeeding or not succeeding to position itself in the region vis-a-vis the United States?
The media did not see it at all. They did not know about it. Even if they knew about it, they did not say anything about it. It's just not interesting enough.
As for the Israeli government, I don't think that they actually think about anything other than the war right now. I think that the relevant officials probably knew a little bit about the fact that there was some kind of forum. Maybe some of them were following that, but there was minimal interest.
I wouldn't say that it's an event that registers very significantly, but there was actually this time around quite a bit of coverage of it in Arabic language satellite channels like Sky News. I think the ongoing war in Gaza raised its profile regionally. I would say that on average, there was more coverage of it this year because of the attendance of some of the leaders.
I think for Arab Officialdom, yeah, certainly. The Saudis are now very eager to kind of invest significant political capital into these types of forums and you can also see it from how the other Arab states have sent heads of state. But I think that at the popular level, if you mention this forum people have no idea what you're talking about.
We are distracted strategically, and honestly in the strategic community, I haven't heard people, you know, saying, “Oh, let's watch the Chinese statement”.
Did the joint statement on Palestine surprise you?
No. I think the Chinese calculation now is very much focused on alignment with the Arab side. It is very much focused on expressing the views as they're seeing from the Arab side. I think that the calculation in Beijing is to say, “okay, we are gonna get the most of this kind of position in a few ways. One, of course, we are countering the American position, so the US supports Israel, we support the Palestinians. Two, we're showing countries in the region, in the Gulf and other areas that we are very much on their side. And hopefully we'll get some economic dividends from it.”
No, definitely not. I did not find anything new about it. They condemn, of course, the Israeli continued aggression against the Palestinian people. I think that the interesting thing is China is very vocal on the Palestinian issue, but I think that what really matters is what China does not say. For example, they did not say “Hamas”. They did not say “terror”. So many narratives that are missing, so many points that are missing from China's message.
I was surprised to see more on the Arab side. I mean, I was surprised to see the Arab condemnation of the United States for using its veto power against Palestinian statehood. I'm not surprised the Chinese would sign up to such a condemnation.
Not really, to be honest. I think it’s in tune with what the Chinese have signaled and said since the crisis began. And the cost of such joint statements isn't very high either: globally there are condemnations emerging left and right about Israel’s behavior. It might have some utility in terms of underscoring alignment with the positions espoused by most Arab states on what is going on.
It wasn't a surprise, but what was surprising to me is the level of unilateralism and the extreme, the high level of criticism. You know, China, if we take this in a broader perspective, in the former statements before the October 7th, there was always this feeling that China was somehow balancing, and that China was a balancing force in the Middle East. And now we are hearing this. The music, to my ear, is the music of the 1960s and 70s, as if we were coming back to this kind of bipolar world.
Is China seen as an important actor in the Israel-Palestine dispute?
Do Israelis think of China as a potential mediator or a good faith partner in resolving the conflict? No. So I think even before the war, just for context, China in the past has made a few offers to mediate. And they had four and five point plans for peace in the Middle East. It's always seen as lip service and not taken very seriously. Even after the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, you remember that the Chinese said, okay, we'll tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict next. And Abbas was in Beijing and Netanyahu was meant to be there in October. He didn't go. But even then, and even in that context, when things were good, no one took China seriously as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.
That wasn't a real option. And of course, after the war, and with the Chinese very one-sided approach and criticism of Israel, then Israel definitely doesn't see China as a relevant mediator. And that's why I think the Chinese decided to have this Hamas-Fatah track, because that's a way to be a mediator without dealing with Israelis and the Americans.
Definitely not a neutral mediator. But now, after October 7th, definitely, definitely not. I don't see Israel agreeing to China's mediation. I don't see any mediation going on without the US.
A good faith partner, yes, but not a pivotal player of any description. I would say China is seen as a state that can play a secondary role. It can lend its support through the UN Security Council by drumming up diplomatic support, taking a strong pro-Palestinian position, including at the ICJ and so on. But not a pivotal player that would play a central role in helping so resolve dispute. I wouldn't say so, no.
My view is that China does not have the capacity to really bring about change or play a mediation role in the context of this conflict. There are some Arab parties in the region, especially those who have a kind of a Eurasian alliance or axis of resistance reading of geopolitics, who see China as potentially playing that role. But really, when push comes to shove, and when you look at kind of the accumulated experiences we have with China wading into this issue, like the three points, the four points, the five points…etc. nothing substantive has come out of it because it's just not their mediation style, and they don't actually have the coercive capacity to reshape Israeli politics, which is the core issue. At the end of the day you are dealing with two parties where there is a huge asymmetry in power. The control of territory, the control of resources, everything from A to Z, all the cards, are really in the hands of one party. Because of that, and if one really wants a peaceful outcome, you need to have an actor that is willing to actually impose pressure on the Israelis, and that actor is realistically going to be the US. Unfortunately, and unless there's a fundamental reshaping of the American approach to this conflict and its appetite for imposing pressures, it won’t matter who is involved, including China. At least this is how I see it.
From an Israeli point of view, no. And it's never been a credible actor. It's not a historical actor. It doesn't have real and long-term ties, maybe just with the Palestinians, but it, it has never lived up to its ambitions. And from an Israeli point of view, this is a paper tiger. This is just a way to position itself as a broker in the area without any concrete, offer, nothing that is credible.
Not only did China lose its potential position as a contributor to peace and or stability between Israel and the Palestinians, its positions of support for Hamas over the past few months could only help fortify the intransigence of the Hamas leaders in the negotiated ceasefire efforts led by Qatar, Egypt etc.
In other words, when Chinese officials met publicly with Hamas leaders and declared that arm struggle is justified, implying that the Hamas horrific tactics were justified, they were contributing to the prolonging of the war. The repeated one sided declarations against Israel further supported Hamas in digging in its heels regarding any opportunity for ceasefire. Failing to criticize Hamas for endangering its people and for the ongoing torturous captivity of over 100 hostages also strengthens Hamas' resolve to drag out the suffering of the Palestinian people and Israel.
After the joint declaration, do you think the Israeli government would be willing to work with China on anything beyond trade or non-critical contracting? Or has China's response to October 7th done irreparable harm to the relationship? / After this forum, do you think Arab publics and governments see China as an important partner in addressing regional problems?
Good question. So I think in the short term, I don't see a lot of flexibility to do things. I think the Israeli government will be more careful and less interested in doing stuff. And on the other hand, I think that following the 7th of October, there is an understanding in Israel, like I said, that China can also be harmful. So the problem for Israel is now that even if you want to restrict trade, or you want to not allow too much technology stuff, Israel will meet China more and more in the region. We'll be meeting them in Dubai and in Riyadh much more than in Tel Aviv. And that's something that the Israeli government will have to think about moving forward. How do you manage that?
I wouldn't say irreparable, but I think that right now, we're at a very, very, very low point. And things are very sensitive right now. It'll take them a lot of time to go back to the way they were. And we should remember that we were in a decline even before October 7th because of Covid, because of the US-China rivalry. Because of all that, we were in a decline anyway. So now we are even more in a decline. And it'll take a decade to forget. I don't think we can forget that.
There's no reason for Israel to be sympathetic for China or to want anything from China. So I think that Israel will just stick to what is necessary for the economy and nothing more. Because, you know we do have trade. It's not that Israel will cut away from China. It's still the second largest economy in the world. And Israel would like to have connections with it. But I think that it'll be on a much smaller scale. Whatever is necessary for Israel, everyone will look at it. “Do I really need that from China? Do I have an alternative?”
I think they see it as a more important partner than in the past because of the fact that the Chinese managed to take the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, I think that registered somewhat to the region. And now with China taking a strong position on Gaza, converging with the Arab states on calling for an international conference, taking a strong position at the UN and at the ICJ, I think there's a cumulative effect such that China is seen as a more visible player and as a more amenable or aligned global player and great power on this file. But again, I don't think that China is now all of a sudden seen as rivaling the United States in importance, and it's seen as more amenable, it's seen as more aligned in its views on this specific issue with Arab states and public, but I don't think it's seen as being anywhere near as important as the US for example, on this issue.
I don't see the Chinese playing that role. At the end of the day, it really has to come from the US because if American pressures increase, then Israel's capacity to actually resist reaching an agreement – a two state solution – diminishes.
I would say no and no. So, I don't think Israel will go beyond any - I mean the business community, this is something else - but I don't think we'll see any big initiative there from the Israeli side. Regarding irreversible harm, I'm not sure either, because we seem to be reentering some kind of Cold War type polarization, but we enter it with actors who have retained a great deal of strategic flexibility.