As part of my series on China-Iran relations I was really happy to talk with Niloufar Bagheria, a PhD candidate at Australia National University whose dissertation focuses on this poorly understood bilateral relationship. Earlier this year, Niloufar published a great article in Asian Affairs looking at China’s role in the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. That it was announced in Beijing has been used as an example of China’s growing diplomatic capacity to shape events in the Middle East, as well as it’s supposed ability to influence Iran’s behavior.
I’ve never been satisfied with the explanation that Chinese diplomacy was the key variable in this agreement - there were so many important domestic and regional factors that led decision-makers in Riyadh and Tehran to conclude that they needed to change their approach to each other. Attributing significant events to the interests of extra-regional actors is a consistent problem in how people tend to analyze Gulf politics, and I think part of why so many people get the Middle East wrong.
So I was happy to read Niloufar’s article, which does a great job of laying out the domestic considerations in Iran leading up to the decision, and a good job of looking at the same in Saudi. The role of regional actors Oman and Iraq get recognition, and China’s role is, I think, correctly weighted. One interesting point I hadn’t considered
